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Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws
Against Discrimination
Kenneth Montlack*
N ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER A VARIETY of federal statutes barring
racial discrimination, the federal judiciary has increasingly relied
upon statistical evidence in determining the existence of unlawful
discrimination. This article will seek to identify the nature and
extent of such reliance on statistical evidence, discuss the reasons
for the increasing use of statistical evidence, analyze the significance
of the increase, and explore the potential for using statistical evi-
dence in actions by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
The Role of Statistical Evidence In Decisions Rendered
Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 prohibits discrimina-
tion due to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin by employ-
ers, labor organizations, apprenticeship committees and employment
agencies. In a variety of decisions rendered under Title VII, the
three levels of the federal judiciary have expressly utilized, evalu-
ated and commented upon statistical evidence as a tool in proving
unlawful discriminatory practices. These decisions have involved
challenged pre-employment requirements, 2 other failures or refusals
to hire,3 no-transfer rules,4 unlawful seniority systems, 5 closed re-
cruitment systems, 6 lack of upgrading opportunities,' and union dis-
*Chief, Cleveland Office, Civil Rights Section, Office of the Ohio Attorney General;
formerly Project Director, EEOC-Grant, Equal Employment Opportunity Program for
Ohio (1969-1970); Attorney-in-Charge, Legal Aid Society Neighborhood Law Office
(1967-1969); Senior Investigator, Ohio Civil Rights Commission (1966-67).
I wish to acknowledge my appreciation to the Office of Attorney General for consenting
to the use, in portions of this article, of material previously researched in the course of
my duties for the Office.
'CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000 et seq. (1970) as amended EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITY ACT OF 1972, U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973).
'Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Gregory v. Litten Systems, Inc.,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), afl'g as modified, 316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal 1970) Hicks
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp,, 319 F.Supp, 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
3 United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir 1969); Gates v. Georgia-Par.
Corp., 326 F.Supp. 397 (D- Ore- 1970); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F.Supp. 97
(M.D.N.C. 1969), ag/'d in part (including findings of discrimination) and vac'd in part,
438 F.2d 86 (4th Cit. 1971).
4Jones v. LeeWay Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 954, (1971); Bing v. Ruadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cit. 1971).
'United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), a/I'd 446
F.2d 652 (2d Cit. 1971); United States v. Papermakers, Local 189, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969); Quares v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 319 F.Supp. 161 (E.D. Va. 1970).
'Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cit. 1970).
7 United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cit. 1971), cert denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir 1970);
United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F.Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
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crimination in membership,' and referral9 programs. In most such
decisions the federal courts have identified, and declared unlawful,
patterns of systemic racial discrimination; that is discrimination
wherein apparently neutral criteria have the effect of perpetuating
past racial discrimination in the employer's facility and/or in society
at large." The courts' willingness to rely on statistics in fair em-
ployment cases both results from their more sophisticated approach
to the substantive body of civil rights laws and provides an impetus
for the continued development of that body of law.
Recognizing the inherent class nature of racial discrimination,
numerous federal courts have held that specific instances of dis-
parate racial treatment are not required to prove the existence of
acts, practices or patterns which violate Title VII." In United States
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 38,12 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court in the
Northern District of Ohio, ordering it to retain jurisdiction of the
matter, despite a showing that the local union had elected new and
enlightened leadership and was taking positive acts to integrate the
local. The Sixth Circuit, acknowledged those commendable union
actions, taken subsequent to the original district court finding of
unlawful discrimination, but also noted evidence showing that only
'United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 315 F.Supp.
1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), ctr. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. .B.E.W.
Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States
v, Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (9th Cit. 1969); E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers,
Local 189, 311 F.Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970); United States v. Plumbers, local 73, 314
F.Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
'United States v. I.B.F.W. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
943 (1970); E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers, Local 189, 311 F.Sapp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
"See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 242, (1971); Gregory v. Litten
Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cit. 1972), afl'g as inodified, 316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F.Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Jones v.
LeeWay Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cit. 1970), cart, denied, 401 U.S. 954,
(1971); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cit. 1971); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); United States v. Papermakers, Local 189, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (ED_ Va. 1968); United States v. Continental
Can Co., 319 F.Supp. 161 (E.D Va. 1970); Parharn v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433
F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir 1969); United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 314 F.Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969);
United States v- Hayes Int'l. Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Dillon
Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cit. 1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cit. 1971) cort.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Jones v. LeeWay Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th
Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d
687 (5th Cit. 1971); Gates v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 326 F.Supp. 397 (D. Ore. 1970); Lea
v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F.Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), ajJ'd in part (including findings
of discrimination) and vacd in Part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sheet
Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. I.B.E.W. Local
38, 428 F.28 144 (6th Cir. 1970), ert. denied, 400 US_ 943 (1970); United States v.
Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
319 F.Supp. 161 (E.D. Va. 1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F.Supp. 314
(E.D. La. 1970).
12428 F.2d 144 (6th Cit. 1970).
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a small proportion of the union's work referrals were black, as con-
trasted to the many qualified black tradesmen in the Cleveland
area. The court ruled that specific discriminatory acts against in-
dividuals were not required as a prerequisite for the trial court's
retention of jurisdiction, and that its concern over the continu-
ing low proportion of minority group referrals did not violate the
prohibition in Title VII of preferential treatment due to racial
imbalances.13
In Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight14 the evidence revealed that
all of the black drivers were confined to lower paying city routes,
that 80 percent of the whites were in the better paid "line drivers"
(i.e. inter-city drivers) category and that a company "no-transfer"
rule was enforced "equally" against the drivers in both categories.
The court held that such facts established a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination and reasoned as follows:
True, no specific instances of discrimination have been
shown. However, because of the historically all-white make-
up of the company's line driver category, it may well be
that Negroes simply do not bother to apply.
1 5
In Lea Cone Mills Corp.1 a district court in North Carolina
noted that prior to July, 1965, no black females had been employed
at the employer's facility, and that only seven black females were
so employed between July, 1965 and November, 1966 -along with
22 white females, 53 black males, and 85 white males, The trial
court, in finding that the defendant had discriminated against black
females, did not require evidence as to the number of black females
who had applied for employment. 7 The court stated:
While the defendant's Personnel Policy Manual . . . directs
the selection of applicants for employment without regard
to race, statistics, which often tell more than words, effec-
tively refute the claim that the policy was practiced with
respect to Negro females .... 1
In this instance, the court assumed that if black females had not,
in fact, applied for employment, then the most plausible explanation
1Id. at 149-51.
1"431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970).
I Id. at 245, 247.
16 301 F.Supp. 97 (M.D. N.C. 1969).
17 Id. at 97, 102.
is Id.
1973]
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for this was the knowledge by potential applicants that such efforts
would be futile." On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed these findings.20
In perhaps the most significant decision under Title VII ex-
pressly emphasizing statistical evidence in lieu of specific incidents
of disparate treatment, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and criticized the lower court ruling in United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co."' The appellate court held that while no precise math-
ematical formula was applicable in Title VII "pattern and practice"
actions, the government was not tied to the "single or isolated in-
cident barrier"." Instead, the Court found, as probative, evidence
that the defendant failed to promote blacks, while promoting sub-
stantial numbers of whites; that, both before and after the effective
date of Title VII, defendant's facility contained "black" depart-
ments and "white" departments; and that, in a work force with
about 50 percent blacks, whites generally held the better jobs. 3
Curiously, the court's opinion first held that the government's sta-
tistics did not establish a prima facie case ;24 however, after setting
forth those statistics, the court stated that such evidence, absent
defendant's explanations in rebuttal, should have been given sub-
stantial weight by the trial court, and did indicate that the company
equated job classifications with race.25
The Jacksonville Terminal Co. opinion also enunciated a second
important principle which complements the use of statistical evi-
dence: that lack of "intent" or presence of "good faith" does not
constitute a defense to unlawful discriminatory practices.26 This
principle also merits discussion, here. Prior to the Fifth Circuit
opinion in Jacksonville Terminal Co., numerous other federal
opinions, expressly relying upon statistical evidence, recognized
that specific evidence of unlawful motivation or evil intent was not
necessary in proof of Title VII violations.2
19 Id.
2 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part and vacating (trial court's refusal to grant
attorney's fees) in part, 301 F.Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
11451 F.2d 418 (5th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
221d. at 441.
'Id. at 441-42.
4Id. at 441.
1s Id. at 442.
25 Id. at 442, 443.
"See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F.Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Gregory
v. Litten Systems, Inc., 455 F.2d 801, (D.C. Cal., 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. I.B.E.W. Local 38,
428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
[Vol. 22:259
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The United States Supreme Court enunciated this principal in
its landmark Title VII decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co." In the
Griggs case, the court cited the 1960 census for the state in which
the defendant's facility was located, which census indicated that
34 percent of the white males had completed high school as com-
pared to 12 percent of the black males; and that the defendant,
against a pre-Act background of disparate treatment of black ap-
plicants, began utilizing two unvalidated tests and a high school
diploma requirement for employment, at the effective date of
Title VII.11
The Court held that because (1) such requirements excluded
a disproportionate number of minority group applicants and (2)
the defendant was unable to show that such criteria were job-
related, the defendant-employer had violated the provisions of Title
VII. The Court rejected defendant's claim that it did not intend to
discriminate, and held that under Title VII,
. . . practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral on terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior dis-
criminatory employment practices .... 30
Both by its express wording and the inferences which it drew
from the presented statistical evidence, the Griggs decision rein-
forced the crucial rule of interpretation in Title VII decisions:
procedures, standards or conditions in an employment system which
result in an adverse impact upon a protected class are unlawfully
discriminatory, 31 unless the employer can establish the business
necessity for such procedures.3 2 By probing the adverse impact of
employment policies, rather than requiring plaintiff to establish (1)
overt racial prejudice or (2) disparate treatment as between one
identified minority group person and a second majority group per-
son, decisions now tend to focus upon the discriminatory conditions
21401 U.S. 424 (1971).
201d. at 425-31.
'Old. at 430.
uSee former §703(a) (1) and (2), Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1970).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refusc
to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment...
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his eisployces us applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
37 For discussion of employers' burden of establishing business necessity under Title VII see
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2nd Cit. 1971); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906
(1972) necessity, not established; Spurlock v. United Airlines, _--F.2d .... , 5 E.P.D.
7996 (10th Cir. 1972), necessity established.
1973]
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in our society which, without business justification, have been
incorporated into employment systems. This change removes the
often impossible burden upon the plaintiff to "prove" evil intent or
demonstrate disparate treatment, as against the panoply of possible
defenses that the minority group member was less "qualified," as
measured by any number of objective or subjective criteria.33
Thus, in Gregory v. Litten Systems, Inc.m a federal district
court in California, preceding the Griggs decision by eight months,
declared unlawful the defendant-company's practice of requiring
applicants to reveal their arrest records. The court noted that
statistical evidence established a higher frequency of black arrests
as compared to white arrests, and that the company was unable to
show a business necessity as justification for the policy. Similarly,
in Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America," the same district
court held that an employer's discharge of a black employee with
several garnishments of his wages under a company rule requir-
ing employees to conduct their personal finances in such a way as
to avoid garnishments amounted to unlawful discrimination on
account of race, even though" the policy was adopted in good faith
with no intent to discriminate and was racially neutral on its face
and was objectively and fairly applied. While the adverse impact
of the company rule is not debated, this case has been criticized as
expanding the "business necessity" rule to an unreasonable limit.35
Title VII decisions relying on statistical evidence invariably
look to that data as the basis for broad affirmative relief.3 7 Two
decisions requiring employers to expend literally millions of dollars
to correct unlawful seniority systems typify this trend. Quarles v.
Phillip Morris, nc.3' was the first such case in which an entire
" An atypical recognition of the plaintiff's heavy burden in race discrimination cases is con-
tained in the opinion of Judge Stanley Fuld nearly 20 years ago in Holland v. Edwards
(Sub nor State Commission Against Discrimination v. Holland) 3D7 N.Y. 38, 45, 119
N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954), citing N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 431 (1941)
One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected
to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his
discriminatory practices in ways that are devious by methods subde and elusive
- for we deal with an area in which "subtleties of conduct" . . .play no small part.
1472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) aff'g as modified, 316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
35332 F.Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3See 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (May, 1972).
3rSee, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970),
affid 466 F.2d 652 (2d Cit. 1971); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (ED.
Va. 1968); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied. 406 US. 906 (1972). United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir. 1971), aff'd 315 F.Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); United States v. I.B.E.W. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cit. 1970), cart. denied,
400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1969); E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers, Local 159, 311 F.Supp. 468 (S.D. 1970); United
States v. Plumbers, Local 73, 314 F.Supp. (S.D. Ind. 1969).
8Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
[V4ol. 22:259
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seniority system was declared unlawful. In Quarles the court re-
viewed the company's increased proportion of new black employees
from 1.9 percent in 1961 to 6.5 percent in 1965, and to approxi-
mately 80 percent in 1966 and 1967. The trial court held that the
prior discrimination in hiring, reflected by the earlier statistics,
combined with a departmental seniority system, had the effect of
perpetuating past discrimination by "locking in" newly hired black
employees. 9 The court found the entire seniority system unlawful,
and ordered that it be modified.4"
To the same effect in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.41
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discounted company protests
that the proposed group relief would impair plant safety and effi-
ciency and damage employee morale.
In other cases, courts have required similarly far-reaching
changes in union membership, referral procedures and apprentice-
ship policies, 2 based largely upon statistical evidence presented .It
is noteworthy that the courts have generally supported the dis-
covery and investigation efforts required to reach statistical and
other evidence beyond those specific facts limited to a named plain-
tiff's charge. Obviously such support is invaluable to (1) the gather-
ing of statistical data and (2) the designing of appropriate relief.,
In this regard the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Blue Bell
Boots, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," ruled
that the fullest inquiry into an employer's pattern of action, beyond
the complainant's own circumstances, is permissible under Title VII,
because racial discrimination is, by definition, a class matter.3 The
Court reasoned as follows:
. . evidence concerning employment practices other than
those specifically charged by Complainants may be properly
considered by the Commission in framing a remedy. Title
3 Id.
40 Id.
4' United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
42See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), afl'g 315
F.Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v.
I.B.E.W., Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir, 1970), cart. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
3 Because this article focuses upon statistical evidence, the issue of numeric standards in
court-ordered remedies is not treated here. Lengthy discusions of that issue ate found
in Contractors Ass'n. of Eastern Pa. v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), ag'g 311
F.Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Commonwealth of Pa. v. O'Neill ....... F.2d 5 E.P.D.
7974 (3d Cir. 1972) vacating and ren'g, in part, 348 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
44 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
1Sld. at 358.
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should not be construed
narrowly, and the Commission may, in the public interest,
provide relief which goes beyond the limited interest of the
charging party ... 46
A number of courts in Title VII actions have rejected the plain-
tiffs' statistical evidence as insufficient to establish a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination, 41 or, having acknowledged that the
statistics were sufficient, then determined that the defendant had
rebutted those statistics by sustaining their burden of establishing
a business necessity.4" In United States v. National Lead Company,4
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal
to issue a preliminary injunction based upon plaintiff's showing
that only three of the defendant's 97 foremen were black, that 32
of the black employees were regarded by the company as promot-
able to the foreman's positions, but that none had been promoted
during the prior two years. The appellate court reasoned that the
district court's exercise of its discretion in refusing to issue the
prcliminary injunction was not clearly erroneous and that the
plaintiff's facts in support of its motion had been only partially
developed. 0
In Richardson v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.,51 a federal trial
court in Indiana rejected plaintiff's showing that blacks comprised
slightly more than 67 percent of the population in the county where
the defendant-company was located, while comprising only about
one-half that proportion of the company's work force. Looking to
evidence of the defendant's minority group recruitment efforts, the
court noted that no evidence as to the proportion of blacks among
those applying for employment had been introduced. 2 In Terrell v.
Feldstein Co."3 the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the lower court's
refusal to consider proferred statistical evidence, holding that re-
fusal not clearly erroneous because such evidence did not appear
relevant to the company's alleged refusal to promote the individual
plaintiff. Although the appellate court, in the short per curiam
4 United States v. National Lead Co., 438 E.2d 935 (8th Cit. 1971), aff'g 315 F.Supp. 912
(E.D. Mo. 1970); Richardson v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., ____ F.Supp ...... , 63 L.C.
§9490 (S.D. Ind. t970); Terrell v. Feldstein Co., F.2d ...... 5 EF_-D. 8023 (5th Cit_
1972).
4Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc - F.2d __, 5 E.P.D. 17996 (loth Cir. 1972). Ochoa
v. Monsanto Co., ...... F.Supp . ,4 E.P.D. 7739 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
49438 F.2d 935 (8th Cit. 1971), af'g 315 F.Supp. 912 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
"id. at 939.
" __ F.Supp. .__ 63 L.C. §9490 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
52 Id.
" F.2d 5 E.P.D, ff8023 (5th Cit. 1972).
[Vol. 22:259
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opinion, did recognize the probative value of statistics in establish-
ing motive, intent or purpose, the opinion may be quite significant
in view of the broad interpretation of Title VII usually extended
by the Fifth Circuit panels.
In Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc. 4 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that plaintiff's evidence, only 9 of the 5,900 flight
officers in defendant's employ were black, did indeed establish a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. The court ruled, how-
ever, that the airline met its heavy burden by showing that its
requirements of 500 hours of flight time and a college degree were
job related. 55 This opinion also appears significant in view of the
court's reluctance to nullify the airline's pre-employment require-
ments for positions involving great responsibilities to public safety.
The Spurlock decision may represent a practical limitation in the
application of the Griggs "adverse impact-business necessity"
doctrines.
The restrained enthusiasm with which some courts greet sta-
tistical evidence is reflected in Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc." Here,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a lower court
finding of discrimination based, in part at least, on statistical evi-
dence. The court, while recognizing the value of such evidence,
somewhat hedged its bet by reasoning that the statistical informa-
tion was not the controlling evidence upon which the trial court
had relied in reaching its decision?7
Such reservations notwithstanding, the clear trend in major
Title VII actions has been the acceptance of statistical evidence
showing low minority group participation in the employer's work
force as establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimina-
tion8 Prior to the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.59 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,"o evaluated employment statistics indicating the low pro-
54 F.2d , 5 E.P.D. 97996 (lOth Cir. 1972).
55 
.
5 6457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972).
57 Id.
58 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, (1971); Gregory v. Litten Systems, Inc., 472
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), a'g at modified 316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); United
States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cit. 1969); Jones v. LeeWay Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. H, K. Porter Co., 296 F.Supp. 40
(N.D. Ala. 1968); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971),
afl'g 315 F.Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
59 4c1 U.S. 424 (1971).
68433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
19731
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portion of blacks in each position, each job category, and through-
out the defendant's facility; then concluded:
We hold as a matter of law that these statistics, which
revealed an extraordinarily small number of black em-
ployees, except for the most part as menial laborers,
established a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.1
In explaining their reliance on statistical evidence, a number
of courts cite the appellate court holding in State of Alabama v.
United States,2 that "in the problem of racial discrimination, sta-
tistics often tell much and courts listen". 63 Thus, in decisions ren-
dered under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the weight
accorded to statistical data generally reflects (1) the degree of
disparity revealed, (2) the relevance of the statistical data to the
issues and (3) the sufficiency of the employer's explanations of
such disparities. To this effect the trial court in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,1 commented upon the possible hazards in
evaluating the presented statistical evidence, then concluded:
But the difficulties inherent in the process [of drawing
inferences] should not render the use of such statistics
improper. Probabilities guide men in their everyday affairs.
Evidence of statistical probability may likewise be con-
sidered by a finder of fact in determining the questions
presented . . . [I]n some cases the statistics might raise
such a compelling inference in the absence of any contrary
explanation as to make out a prima facie case of discrim-
inatory patterns or practices."
While greater sophistication in both the presentation and evalua-
tion of statistical evidence can be expected, it is clear that such
evidence will continue to occupy center stage in future Title VII
litigation.
The Role of Statistical Evidence In Decisions Rendered
Under Other Federal Civil Rights Statutes
In actions commenced under the "Reconstruction" civil rights
acts in 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982, and 1983 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, the same trend towards
extensive reliance on statistical data is evident. Decisions holding
61 Id. at 426.
62304 F.2d 583 (jrh Cir. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
"I1d. at 586.
11312 F.Supp, 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1970).
Is Id. at 992.
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that public employers administered discriminatory examinations to
applications for positions as policemen, 66 firemen 6 7 teachers,68 and bus
drivers,69 and that public employers discriminated in teacher assign-
ments and discharges, 0 are largely based on statistical evidence. To
the same effect are other major decisions identifying unlawful
educational systems," unlawful jury selection 1' and school board
membership procedures," discriminatory public and low-income
housing tenant and site-selection procedures,1 ' private housing dis-
crimination,75 denial of voting rights,76 withholding of hospital pro-
fessional privileges and discriminatory allocation of municipal
services."
The courts have extensively relied upon statistical data to
identify patterns of willful discrimination. While such patterns
know no geographical boundaries, the majority of successful chal-
lenges to willful discrimination arose in the southern states. In a
series of actions challenging school districts accused of applying
discriminatory standards for black and white teacher dismissals,
following court ordered desegregation of the system, three circuit
"Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, ..... F.2d ----- , 5 F.P.D. 97974 (3d Cir, 1972); Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725 (1st Cit. 1972); Penn v. Sumpf, 308 F.Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
7Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto, 330 F.Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
"8Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 455 F.2d 1167 (2a Cir. 1972).
6Arlington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
11 Jackon v. Wheatley School Dist., 430 F.2d 1359 (Sth Cia. 1970).
71 Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Smuck v. Hobsen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cit.
1969).
"Turner v. Fouchc, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cit. 1966);
Muniz v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970); Ford v. White, 430 F.2d 951 (5th Cit.
1970).
" Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
74Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill., 1969), affd 436 F.26
306 (7th Cir. 1970); stay denied, 401 953 (1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n. v. Lack-
awana 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cit. 1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
afJ'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1971); Garrett v. Hamtramck, 335 F.Supp. 16
(E.D. Mich. 1971); Morales v. Haines, F.Supp. , E.O.H. §13,543 (N.D. Ill.
1972); but see, North Avondale Neigh. Ass'n. v. Cincinnati Metro. Housing Auth .......
F.2d ------- E.O.H. 113, 555 (6th Cir. 1972) refusing to grant preliminary injunction on
basis of plaintiff's showing that proposed public housing was to be constructed in a neigh-
borhood with 95 percent black residents, and, BeaI v. Lindsay, --- F.2d - -E.ON. ff13,
574 (2nd Cit. 1972) where City of New York rebutted statistical evidence introduced to
show that parks in predominately minority group neighborhoods were maintained on basis
inferior to parks in predominately majority group neighborhoods.
75 Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.Snpp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. Real
Estate Development Co., 347 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972); United States v. Reddoth,
------ F.Supp ...... , No. 6541-71-P (S.D. Ala. 1972), Aff'd, F2d , No. 72-1326 (5th
Cir. 1972).
76 Alabama v. United States, 371 US. 37 (1962).
'
7 Cypress v. Newport News and Non-Sect. Hosp. Ass'n., 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
74 Hawkins v. Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Hadnott v. Prattville, 309 F.Supp. 967
(M.D. Ala. 1970).
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courts of appeals have held that those defendant school systems
with a long history of segregation, which had dismissed only black
teachers after court-ordered desegregation eliminated various teach-
ing positions, were required to present "clear and convincing proof"
to justify their actions where the remaining proportion of black
faculty to white faculty was significantly less than the proportion
of black students to white students."
Turner v. Fouche,8' decided by the Supreme Court in 1970,
recites statistical data and the rebuttal explanations of such data
which are typical of the "prima facie" decisions. In Turner the
black residents of Taliaferro County Georgia, challenging the
methods used to select school board and grand jury members,
showed that blacks comprised 60 percent of the county's popula-
tion, that only 6 of the 23 grand jury members were blacks, and
that disproportionate numbers of potential black members were
removed from the jury list as being "unintelligent" or "not up-
right."1 The Supreme Court held:
In the absence of a countervailing explanation by the
appellees (Taliaferro County, Georgia) we cannot say that
the under-representation reflected in these figures is so in-
substantial as to warrant no corrective action by a federal
court charged with the responsibility of enforcing consti-
tutional guarantees ... .1
The court held that the appellants had demonstrated a sufficient
disparity between the percentage of Negro residents in the county
as a whole, and of blacks on the newly constituted jury list, which
disparity resulted from the highly subjective nature of the selection
process.
In Cyprus v. Newport News General and Nonsectarian Hos-
pital Association,$ the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
challenge of black physicians denied hospital privileges. Evidence
showed that 70 percent of the white physicians, and no blacks,
retained such privileges. The Court found that a prima facie in-
7"Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist., 430 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1970); North Carolina Teachers
Ass'n- v. Bd. of Educ., 393 P.2d 736, 743 (4th Cir., 1968); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ.,
391 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1968; Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cit
1971).
396 U.S. 346 (1970).
BlJ. at 349-358.
e'Id. at 359, 360.
83 Id,
8375 F.2d 648 (4th Cit. 1967).
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ference of discrimination had been established and that no further
proof of unequal treatment based on race was required, the burden
of proof having been "thrown to the party having the power to pro-
duce the facts" necessary to refute the inference. 5
In Muniz v. Re o,6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, which had refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus,
upon a showing by the Mexican-American petitioner that approxi-
mately 3 percent of the grand jury which had indicted him 28
years previously were Mexican-Americans, as compared to their 15
percent-20 percent representation in the county population. The
Muniz decision held that this cited disparity established an un-
rebutted inference of unconstitutional behavior, and that such sta-
tistics "do more than speak for themselves - they cry out 'dis-
crimination' with unmistakable clarity."87
The decisions in the teacher assignment cases, Turner, Cyprus,
and Muniz, expressly or implied examined racially motivated prac-
tices; however, as court challenges to state and local action "came
north" and developed a new emphasis on discrimination as an unjust
effect, a new trend in §§1981-1983 decisions paralleled, then incor-
porated, the Title VII case precedent.
It is now well-settled that the use of sufficiently damning sta-
tistical evidence precludes the necessity that plaintiff show specific
instances of disparate treatment" or wrongful intent, 9 and that
such evidence establishes a prima facie case of unlawful discrim-
ination under §§1981-1983.90 In Hansen v. Hobson," District Court
Judge J. Skelly Wright stated:
s1 Id. at 655.
1'434 F.2d 697 (5th Vir. 1970).
'7Id. at 700; accord, Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1966) granting writ of
habeas corpus based on unexplained, "very decided variations in proportions of Negroes
and whites on jury lists from racial proportions in the population."
"8See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th
Cir 1966); United v. Frazer, 317 F.Supp. 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
" Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
Arlington v. Mass. Bay Trans. Auth., 306 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Mass 1969); Hansen v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cii. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F.Supp.
907 (N.D. I1. 1969), aff'd 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), stay denied, 401 U.S. 953
(1971).
"See, e.g,, Caitel N. Callagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th C4. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1960), aff'd per cariam, 371
U.S. 37 (1962); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cit. 1972); Arlington
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969); Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S 346 (1970); Labat v- Bennett, 365 F.26 698 (5th Cir. 1966); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. Il. 1969), afl'd 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cit. 1970),
stay denied, 401 U.S. 953 (1971); Newbero v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.Supp. 407 (S.D.
Ohio 1968); Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist., 430 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1970); North
(Continued on next page)
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Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to our matur-
ing concept of equality that, with the help of Supreme Court
decisions in the last decade we now firmly recognize that
the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous
and unfair to private rights and public interest as the per-
versity of a willful scheme."
Two years before the Supreme Court decision in Griggs, a federal
district court in Massachusetts reviewed data which showed that
pre-employment tests administered to applicants for bus driver
positions had an adverse impact upon minority group applicants.
The court held that the evidence raised an unrebutted inference
of "a de facto pattern of classification."93
In seven recent civil rights actions the federal courts, relying
upon statistical evidence, have applied the adverse impact rule to
non-Title VII actions, with differing results. Because of their great
effect upon public employment patterns, and their erosion of case
law precedent permitting appplication of statutory standards to
private citizens as against constitutional standards to governmental
agencies, these ruling are noteworthy. In Chance v. Board of Ex-
aminers," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated data show-
ing that (1) majority group applicants for positions as principal
and vice principal in the New York school system were successful
in the promotional examinations at a rate of one and one-half to
twice that of minority group applicants and (2) only 1.3 percent
of the principals in that system were black as compared to 16.7
percent in Detroit and Philadelphia, 8.0 percent in Los Angeles, and
6.9 percent in Chicago. Against defendant's arguments that many
non-discriminatory factors could explain such disparity, the court
held that the school system had not sustained its burden of proving
the validity of those tests."
In Castro v. Beecher," the First Circuit Court of Appeals also
compared two sets of statistics showing that (1) 16.3 percent of
the Boston population were black, while only 2.3 percent of its
police department were black and (2) 65 percent of the whites
(Continued from preceding page)
Carolina Teachers Ass'n. v. Bd. of Edoc., 393 F.2d 736, 743 (4th Cir. 1968); Rolfe v.
County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cit. 1968); Moore v. Bd. of Ednc., 448 F.2d
709, 711 (8th Cit. 1971); Shield Cub of Cleveland ------ F.Supp. 5 E.P.D. 8406 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
91269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
12 Id. at 4 97.
"Arlington v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F.Supp. 1355, 1358-9 (D.C. Mass. 1969).
94458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 1176-78.
96459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
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had passed the challenged police entrance examination, while only
25 percent of the blacks were successful. In holding these police
examinations to be unlawful, as not rationally related to the posi-
tions in question, the court discarded arguments that many whites
also suffered from the adverse impact of the examinations. The ap-
pellate court held that the low rating achieved in the examination
by some majority group persons who were outside of the "main-
stream white" educational, social and cultural establishment did not
preclude the findings of discrimination. The court reasoned that it
is not necessary in such cases to show that blacks and Spanish sur-
named Americans have a monopoly on the discriminatory impact
shown.' 7 Also significant was the court's ruling that where a racial
impact is documented, the public employer must meet the same
burden of proof as noted in Griggs. It may not rely upon any
"reasonable version of the facts" as a constitutional defense, but
must come forward with "convincing facts" showing that the chal-
lenged job qualifications were job related." Notwithstanding this
broad ruling, the First Circuit expressed its uneasiness with the
presentation of combined statistics showing the adverse impact of
separate requirements: (1) a high school diploma or its equivalency
and (2) an honorable discharge from the military service."9
In a Third Circuit opinion invalidating police entrance exam-
inations,1 00 evidence showing that whites had approximately 1.82
better chance of passing the required written tests as compared to
blacks was excepted as probative of unlawful discrimination. How-
ever, the district court's preliminary injunction, prescribing a ratio
hiring system of one black for each two whites, was vacated due to
the appellate court's dissatisfaction with the lack of evidence in the
record as to the significance of the various statistical data and ex-
amination requirements. 01
In Allen v. City of Mobile,l02 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently affirmed the district court finding that the Mobile Police
Department was guilty of unlawful discrimination in its policy of
racial identification, racially motivated police assignments, and
maintenance of an unlawful seniority system. At the same time the
'71d at 731.
92d. at 732, 733; Recently cited by the District Court of Northern Ohio in Shield Club v.
City of Cleveland. F.Supp , 5 E.P.D. 8406 (N.D. Ohio 1972), where Judge
Thomas held that the disparity between 26.3 per cent of minority group failures as against
4.5 per cent white failures on the police entrance examination established an unrebutted
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.
"Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
'0OPennsylvania v. O'Neill, -- _F.2d ---- , 5 E.P.D. 17974 (3rd Cir. 1972), vacating and
remanding, in part, 348 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972)_
101 Id.
112466 F.2d 122 (5th Cit. 1972).
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appellate court affirmed the ruling that the police promotional ex-
aminations were, in fact, job-related in that they tested the kinds
of necessary police knowledge gained through experience on the
job. Circuit Judge Goldberg, in a vigorous dissent to this ruling,
argued that defendants failed to produce a true validation study
sustaining their burden of proof. But, beyond the question of test
validation, the dissent noted the grossly disparate promotion rates
of black vis a vis white policemen and the many individual acts
of intentional discrimination proven during the trial. Looking to
decisions in Castro v. Beecher, Chance v. Board of Examiners, and
Carter v. Gallagher13 the judge stated that those courts had placed
even more emphasis on bare statistics without a showing of willful
acts of discrimination, as proven in Allen. The judge also argued
that because the Griggs interpretation of Title VII was directly
applicable to §1983 cases, the City of Mobile ought to have been
held to a stricter burden of proof, which would require defendants
to show a "manifest relationship" between the promotional qualifi-
cations and the job duties, rather than merely showing a rational
relationship under the Fourteenth Amendment.Mu
In the tortuous course of the Carter v. Gallagher decisions' the
courts wrestled with the nature of both the adverse impact shown
and the defendant's burden of proof required in actions challeng-
ing the constitutionality of statutes. In the initial district court
decision, the court, citing sets of statistical evidence showing ad-
verse impact, declared as unlawful (1) defendant's use of arrest
and conviction records on the basis that such standards were not
reasonably related to the performance of the firemen's job duties
and that defendant had established no "compelling state interest"
in such requirements; (2) the prerequisite high school education
or its equivalent, on the same basis; (3) the five years' residency
requirement as a condition to allowing the veterans' preference on
103459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972); 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); ..... F.Supp ......-- 3 EP.D.
'[8205 (D. Minn. 1971).
04 Id.; Judge Goldberg's dissent contains the following comments which, if expanded by the
courts could further increase the burden of defendants in establishing business necessity.
So-called 'objective' tests were once hailed as the defnite answer to 'subjective,'
often discriminatory, hiring or promotion procedures. But it has been increas-
ingly clear as analysis becomes more sophisticated that there can be other, much
more subtle, forms of discrimination lurking in 'objective' testing. It is now
recognized that a test can be impeccably 'objective' in the manner in which the
questions are asked, the test administered and the ansxsers graded, and still be
gressly 'subjective' in the educational or social milieu in which the test is set...
'OsCarter v. Gallagher -... F.Supp ........ 3 E.P.D. 8205 (D. Minn. 1971), ef'd is; part and
ree'd in part, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), reh'g granted en bane, 4 E.P.D. 17615 (Sth
Cir. 1971), modiied after grant of rbl'g, 4 E.P.D. f7616 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972), judg. entered, 4 E.P.D. 7853 (D. Minn. 1972); Hearings on
validity of Minnesota Statute: 3 E.P.D. 8205, ruling by three judge court, 337 F.Supp.
626 (D. Minn. 1971); ruling entered on constitutional issues, 337 F.Supp. 626 (D.
Minn. 1971).
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civil service tests, such requirement having a discriminatory effect
on black veterans, shown to move more often; and (4) placing an
upper age limit of 30 in the Civil Service Commission plan, on the
basis that this requirement also adversely affected minority group
persons subject to past discrimination by defendants.' 6 A three-
judge panel declined to issue an injunction restraining the exercise
of the Minnesota statute reciting the residency requirement for
veterans preference, and referred the matter to a one-judge district
court.'0
That court declared the statute to be unconstitutional.'I Citing
Shapiro v. Thompson,1°0 the decision held that the city had failed to
sustain its burden of showing a compelling government interest
(emphasis by court). The district court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that a showing of "rational relationship" constituted their
burden of proof. Again citing Shapiro the court declared that where
fundamental personal rights are involved, the rational relationship
test is not appropriate.110 Finally, the Eighth Circut Court of Ap-
peals in Carter v. Gallagher affirmed the initial trial court ruling
on a variety of pre-employment requirements. 1 ' The appellate court
noted that none of the 535 fire fighters in Minneapolis were black,
Indian or Mexican-American; that blacks constitute 6.44 percent of
the Minneapolis population; that no substantial evidence to rebut
the inference of racial discrimination had been produced; that a
finding of willful or intentional discrimination under §§1981 and
1983 was not necessary under the applicable Grigg standards; and
that the testing requirements of the city were similarly discrim-
inatory. On the basis of these facts the court, on rehearing,112 issued
a broad injunction which included suspension of "otherwise valid"
state requirements and a plan for ratio hiring of minority group
persons.
In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawana,
New York,' a Second Circuit Opinion and Garrett v. City of Ham-
tramck1 a Michigan federal district court ruling, both actions under
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act (Federal Fair Housing Act),
the courts noted statistical data showing that urban renewal projects
O .... F.Supp . 3 E.P.D. 8205 (D. Minn. 1971).
107 Id,
1- 337 F.Supp 626 (D. Minn. 1971).
"9 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
110Id. at 629-30.
111452 F.2d 315 (sth Cir. 1971).
1124 E.P.D. fl7616 (8th Cir. 1972).
113436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
114 335 F.Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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had caused the concentration of blacks in one predominently black
ward (Kennedy) and the displacement of blacks to surrounding
communities (Garrett). Both courts also noted the role of private
housing discrimination in victimizing the affected blacks. The courts'
injunctive relief in both cases reflects the trend in housing actions,
also, prohibiting public agencies from adopting a passive stance in
the face of private discrimination which their policies may perpetuate.
These seven cases reveal that courts are becoming sensitive to
two major issues: (1) the relation of Title VII standards to non-
Title VII civil rights actions;115 and (2) the growing sophistication,
in non-Title VII actions, also, of the analysis given to plaintiffs'
statistical evidence.11'
Using Statistical Evidence Under Ohio's Laws
Against Discrimination
It is essential that Ohio's Laws Against Discrimination (Ohio
Revised Code, Chapter 4112) be enforced with the same vigor as
the federal civil rights acts. All of the "high impact" federal de-
cisions, considered together, affect only a small proportion of the
protected class under those acts. Although the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is currently preparing to meet its new
litigation responsibilities under Title VII as amended,", Ohio cannot
expect that the federal agency will be capable of fully resolving the
systemic discriminatory patterns in Ohio. William H. Brown, III,
Chairman of the EEOC, recently reported that the estimated incom-
ing charges of discrimination to the EEOC would surpass 45,000
during the present fiscal year and could reach 55,000 by next year. "8
115 This trend can be expected to continue, with the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, which eliminates the exemption of state and local political sub-
divisions from coverage. See former §701(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973).
174Address by John J. Ross, Esq. of Hogan and Hatrson, Washington, D.C., to the Dallas,
Texas, session of the Practicing Law Institute of Equal Employment Opportunities Compli-
ance, February 15-16, 1973, echoed the exasperation felt by many attorneys representing
employers, relative to the courts' acceptance of unrefined statistical data, which Mr. Ross
believes to be often unreliable measures of compliance with the law. He also noted, as
unreliable, statistics seeking to identify Spanish-Susnamed Americans' participation in
employers' work forces.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals seems to share these views; see Mabin v. Lear Siegler,
Inc. 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cit. 1972), and an earlier decision in Lewis v. Grand Rapids, 222
F.Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963), where the court reversed the trial court ruling that the
disprupurtisatCely low number of liquor licenses granted to blacks, relative to their repre-
sentation in the population, raised an inference of unconstitutional discrimination by the
licensing authority.
"'
t See former §706(f) (1) of the CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§2000e-5 (Supp. 1973), authorizing EEOC to bring actions in federal district court fol-
lowing unsuccessful conciliation efforts; see also former §707(c) of the ACT, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-6(b), terminating the U.S. Attorney General's role in Title VII litigation two years
after the effective date of the Act, as amended.
eEP.D. LAB. 1. REP. No. 26 (February 8, 1973).
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Thus, it is apparent that no state should assume that its re-
sponsibilities to eliminate unlawful discrimination will be, or can
be, performed by the federal government.1 ' We may also conclude
from Chairman Brown's report that the great majority of charging
parties under Title VII ought not to rely on EEOC's resources in
seeking judicial relief. It is a fact of life that at present most at-
torneys, who are necessary prerequisites to a successful action, are
either unprepared or reluctant to litigate such cases. Notwithstand-
ing a disappointing history of anti-discrimination enforcement on
state and local levels generally, 0 there is now reason to hope that
Ohio will implement the mandates of the Ohio Constitution21 and
the General Assembly 22 to meet the standards of law enforcement
recognized by the courts of our country.
Ohio's laws against discrimination prohibit discrimination based
on race, color, religion, national origin and ancestry in employment,
public accommodations, and housing."3 Upon receipt of a charge of
discrimination, and in employment cases, upon the initiation of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, that agency undertakes a preliminary
investigation to determine whether it is probable that unlawful
discrimination has occurred. If such investigation reveals that the
respondent (the party charged) has caused or permitted any un-
lawful discriminatory practices, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
shall attempt to eliminate those practices by informal means of
conference, conciliation and persuasion. When unsuccessful, the
commission issues a formal complaint and notice of administrative
hearing. That hearing is a complete adjudicatory proceeding before
a hearing examiner appointed by the agency. Based on the record at
hearing, including testimony, documentary evidence, written and
oral argument, and the hearing examiner's advisory report, the com-
mission issues its order. That order either (1) dismisses the com-
plaint where it has failed to sustain the burden of proving unlawful
discrimination, or (2) upholds the complaint and provides appro-
119 Indeed, Title VII of THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42, U.S.C. §2000h-4 (1970), man-
dates that Title VII shall not pre-empt or invalidate State laws on the subject, unless such
laws conflict with Title VII.
12D If authority beyond our daily perception is requited, see A. BLUNROSEN, BLACK EMPLOY-
MENT AND THE LAW, (1971) 1-50.
121 OHO CONST. Art. 1, 51,
All men are, by nature, free and independant, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, aquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.
Porter v. Oberlin, 1 Ohio St2d 143, 147 (1965), The purpose of equal opportunity
legislation is to support the rights granted by Article I of the Ohio Constitution by pre-
venting interference therewith on the grounds of race, creed, or color.
'2OHIo REV. CODE §§4112.01-4112.99 (Page 1972).
.. OHIO REV. CODE §4112.02 (Page 1972).
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priate relief.2 The final orders of the commission are subject to
judicial review, based upon a test of reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence on the record of the administrative hearing.2l All
parties have the right of further appeal.126
Under this procedure the Ohio Civil Rights Commission is
uniquely equipped to investigate and litigate class-action issues,"'
and to provide relief which extends beyond "settlement" of an in-
dividual complainant's grievance to (1) eradication of the under-
lying unlawful conditions giving rise to the charge, as well as (2)
the requirement of such further affirmative action as will effectuate
the purposes of Ohio's Laws Against Discrimination. 28 The sub-
stantive provisions of Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code are
remarkably similar in phraseology, scope and purpose to Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended (employment) and to Title
VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act (housing). This identity of pur-
pose between the Ohio and Federal Civil Rights Act was recognized
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community Col-
lege District, where the court noted the "strong moral commitment"
of both divisions of government to equal opportunity. 9
These facts, together with the mandate of the General Assembly
that all provisions of Chapter 4112 are to be construed liberally for
the accomplishment of the chapter's purposes,132 authorize, indeed
obligate, Ohio's agencies to utilize decisions interpreting the federal
acts in administrative and judicial actions under Chapter 4112.21
''OHIO REV. CODE §4112.05 (b) (Page 1972).
"
1 OHIO REV. CODE §4112.06 (Page 1972).
"16Ono REv. CODE §4112.061 (Page 1972).
'
0 See OHIO REV. CODE §4112.04(B) (3) (Page 1972) granting full investigatory
subpoena, and interrogatory powers consistent with the rules of discovery applicable to
civil actions in common pleas courts (Ohio R. Civ. P. 26 sets forth broad discovery aurhnriry
consistent with its federal counterpart); see also OHIo REV. CODE §4112.05(E) (Page
1972) providing that reliable, probative and substantial evidence -rather than
the rules of evidence applicable in courts of law or equity-shall be considered in Com-
mission hearings to determine the existence of unlawful discrimination; and Rule 5.01 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations directing that the Commission determine during
investigation whether it is probable that any unlawful practices have occurred (Emphasis
added).
128 See OHIO REV. CODE §4112.05 (G) (Page 1972) authorizing such relief where the
Commission determines that the respondent has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unlawful
discriminatory practice, whether against the complainant or others. See n. 129, infra, regard-
ing standards of relief in employment cases.
12919 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 249 N.E.2d 907, 910 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
'IQ O1O REV. CotsE §4112.08 (Page 1972).
131 Liberally construing a statute the courts (1) resolve all reasonable doubts regarding its
application to the particular case in the affirmative, Dennis v. Smith, 125 Ohio St. 120,
124-125, 180 N.E. 638, 640 (1932); (2) adopt the most comprehensive meaning of the
terms used in the statute en accomplish its aims, Schaefer v. Bernhardt, 76 Ohio St. 443,
448-449, 81 N.E. 640, 641 (1970); (3) avoid any interpretation so norrow or technical as
to defeat the rights granted by the statute, 50 OHIO Jun. 2d Statutes, §278 at 263-64
(Continued on next page)
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STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Of course, the use of statistical evidence in the proceedings of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission is expressly recognized under Ohio
Revised Code §4112.05 (E).
Notwithstanding the great potential in Chapter 4112 for effec-
tive law enforcement, the best that can be said of Ohio's efforts
during the ten years following the enactment of this chapter in 1959,
is that the State, recording few significant judicial decisions, at
least avoided establishing "bad law" in this field. The winds of
change have not neglected Ohio, however. The present Attorney
General has increased his staff of attorneys representing the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission from one part-time counsel to nine full-
time Assistant Attorneys General; created a separate Civil Rights
Division to litigate under Chapter 4112; accepted new responsibil-
ities in equal employment opportunity enforcement under an in-
creased grant from the EEOC; and has expressly recommended to
its client agency, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, that it provide
full and effective relief pursuant to federal standards in its pro-
ceedings.132 By the same token the Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
with a newly appointed commissioner and chairman, has accepted
the challenge of aggressive law enforcement.
One result of these changes is the agencies' effective use of
statistical evidence in Chapter 4112 actions. In the Greater Cleveland
area, such evidence was used at hearings relative to alleged real
estate company practices of steering black home seekers into already
integrated sections of some suburbs, while steering whites away
from those sections.ln Based, in part, upon statistical evidence which
may reflect the operation of an unlawful seniority system, the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission is currently investigating the employment
practices of a large steel company.U A hearing is now scheduled
against a public employer, based upon the commission's complaint
reciting the concentration of black employees in its Solid Waste
(Continued from preceding page)
1962) and (4) consider the statutory objectives, legislative history, laws upon the same or
similar subject, the consequences of a particular construction, and the administrative con-
struction of the statute, Crowi v. DeLuca, 29 Ohio St.2d 53. 58. 278 N.E.2d 352, 356
(1972); OHIO REV. CODE § 1.49 (Page 1972); Miller Properties, Inc., v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n -.... Ohio App.2d -- -, E.O.H. 15, 020 (Franklin County St. of App. 1972).
t32See OHIO ATTN. GEN. OP. 72-006, recommending that Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
where appropriate, require (1) use of separate index of minority group applicants as
employment source, before consulting other sources where necessary to eliminate continu-
ing effects of past and present discrimination: (2) prohibition of arrest record inquiries;
(3) prohibition of recruitment practices which adversely effect minority group persons; (4)
use of private advertising sources designed to reach predominantly minority group persons
as a remedy for the continuing effects of past and present discrimination.
'"In the Matter of Hilltop Realty, Inc., O.C.R.C. Complaint No. 274; In the Matter of Joseph
Laronge, Inc., O.C.R.C. Complaint No. 259; In the Matter of August Bondi. O.C.R.C.
Complaint No. 247, hearings completed, O.C.R.C. orders pending.
1740.C.R.C. v. Republic Steel Corp., O.C.R.C. Charge No. P/NE 12-72-2928.
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Department, as garbage collectors, and virtual absence of blacks in
the other classified and non-classified positions, and the alleged un-
lawful operation of a closed recruiting system and residency re-
quirement to perpetuate the segregated work force. 35 The commission
recently issued an order against the Youngstown Hospital Associa-
tion based on evidence adduced at the administrative hearing which
showed that respondent had utilized an invalid test for its operating
room technicians. The result had been a disproportionate failure rate
for the tested black technicians, most of whom had performed their
operating room duties for years.'
Because such actions are recent, no judicial decisions in the
State courts have treated the commission's use of statistical evidence.
The Ohio Supreme Court has already extended "due deference" to
the legal interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ;137 it would be a bitter irony for Ohio's anti-discrimina-
tion agencies, were the courts to lend a deaf ear to their efforts. By
the same token, it is incumbent on the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
and the Ohio Attorney General to continue to develop and apply
statistical evidence in a sophisticated manner, as part of an effec-
tive law enforcement program. When Ohio courts recognize that
"evil intent" and specific acts of disparate treatment are not the
sole indicia of unlawful discrimination - when those courts rely on
appropriate statistical evidence to raise the inference of discrim-
ination -then, the respondents and potential respondents in Ohio
will act to change the conditions which bar minority groups from
full participation in American society.
T35 In the Matter of The City of Euclid, O.C.R.C. Complaint No. 315, heard on February 28,
March 1-3 and March 5, 1973 before Hearing Examiner Hyman Cohen, Esq.; Hearing
Examiner's Report pending.
I 6 n the Matter of Youngstown Hospital Association, Inc., d.b.a. Northside Hospital, O.C.R.C.
Complaint No. 211.
137 Jones Metals Prod. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 181 (1972), declaring Ohio's
female "protective laws" invalid:
Courts, when interpreting statutes are required to give due deference to an ad-
ministrative interpretation formulated by an agency which has accumulated
substantial expertise, and to which agency Congress has delegated the respon-
sibility of implementing the Cogressional command.
Accord, Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Ct., F.Supp. 60.0.2d 309, 316 (S.D. Ohio
1972).
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